Tvrdim da velikosrpska politika nikad nije odustajala od svojih ciljeva, nego se samo u određenim okolnostima vješto prikrivala i pripremala, tako i za vrijeme SFRJ, čekajući povoljne okolnosti za daljnje sprovođenje tih istih ciljeva, što ne bi bilo moguće bez jake vojne mašinerije odnosno JNA.

To potvrđuje i navedena studija iz koje navodim, po meni, par bitnih citata.

Ubijeđen sam da bi u slučaju procentualne participacije po stvarnoj etničkoj strukturi naroda i narodnosti u svim sferama a prije svega u JNA došlo do više pregovaranja a manje zločina bi bilo počinjeno.
Jugoslavija bi opstala drugačije organizovana ili bi se disoluirala dogovorom.

U daljnjem tekstu slijede dokazi.

Nikola Petrović: ETNIČKA NEREPREZENTATIVNOST U VOJSCI: SLUČAJEVI JUGOSLAVIJE I RUANDE

Evo što je Špegelj zabilježio: “U poratnim godinama u oficirskom su kadru većinu činili Hrvati, Slovenci i Muslimani (Bošnjaci), što je bila posljedica snažnog razvoja antifašističke borbe u zapadnim republikama” (ibid., 2001.: 52). Ipak demobilizacijom u poratnom razdoblju i mirnodopskim napredovanjem u časničkim rangovima takav je omjer radikalno promijenjen. Špegelj govori o srbizaciji JNA i zaključuje da “1989. Srba u JNA ima 34% više od idealnog broja, Crnogoraca 45% više, dok je Slovenaca 60% manje od potrebnih, Hrvata 30% manje, a Bošnjaka te Albanaca, Mađara i drugih nacionalnih manjina čak 60-90% manje od idealnog omjera” (ibid., 2001.:53). Bitno je reći da je prema Špegelju srbizacija JNA otpočela još 1968. godine, no on ne navodi zašto određuje baš tu godinu niti navodi političke odluke ili strukture u vojsci ili politici koje su provodile srbizaciju.

Sada dolazimo do ključnog pitanja: je li manipulacija u kadrovskim službama JNA bila dio nekog tajnog plana srbizacije JNA? Teško je povjerovati da bi u državi, koja je toliko propagirala ravnopravnost i u kojoj je Josip Broz Tito još uvijek vladao čvrstom rukom, JNA mogla steći toliku autonomiju da uspije provesti takav plan.

Zato ne čudi da su svi prigovori koji su se unutar JNA upućivali na etnički sastav nailazili na otpor, jer nitko nije htio remetiti taj sustav usluga i protuusluga. Evo kako je to izgledalo: “..savezni sekretar za narodnu obranu general Nikola Ljubičić, koji je na toj dužnosti bio od 1967. do 1982., konstatirao bi prilikom takvih analiza kako nacionalna pripadnost oficira i generala nije razmjerna udjelu dotičnih nacija u ukupnom jugoslavenskom stanovništvu, kako, štoviše, kadrovski sastav nije uravnotežen ni na razini republičke pripadnosti. Svi bi odmah izrazili zabrinutost nad takvim stanjem i trendom, a onda bi se po kratkom postupku zaključilo da Hrvati, Slovenci, Bošnjaci i još neki jednostavno nisu zainteresirani za službu u JNA, da se u zapadnim republikama na civilnim poslovima može bolje raditi i više zaraditi nego službom u JNA, te da ni dotična republička vodstva nemaju interes za takvu regrutaciju. Na jednoj analizi kadrovanja u SSNO-u, iznio sam primjere prijave kandidata za vojne akademije iz Pule i Varaždina u toku 1969. U Varaždinu su se te godine za vojne akademije bila prijavila 32 mladića, a iz Pule 14, svi su na zdravstvenim pregledima ogla.eni sposobnima, srednju školu završili su ocjenom vrlo dobar ili odličan, a rezultat konačnog prijema u akademije bio je porazan: iz Varaždina su primljeni dvojica iz Pule jedan!. (ibid., 2001.: 57-58).

Sam plan ustroja “Jedinstvo” potaknut je pitanjem zapovijedanja JNA nakon Titove smrti. Vrh JNA je smatrao da kolektivno predsjedništvo SFRJ ne bi bilo, najblaže rečeno, adekvatno te se pojačavala autonomija vojske. Etnička neravnoteža i dominacija Srba i Crnogoraca u JNA omogućila je preuzimanje institucije JNA od strane proponenata velikosrpske politike unutar JNA. Bitno je kako je “osobito visok udio bio u visokim činovima” (Žunec 1998.: 104) pa je vrh JNA postao sve više jednonacionalan ili dvonacionalan, te je tako mogao provoditi odluke koje su išle na štetu drugih republika i naroda. S druge strane u Srbiji je jačao Slobodan Milošević koji je srušio vodstva Autonomnih pokrajina Kosova i Vojvodine te Socijalističke Republike Crne Gore i tako pridobio njihovu moć tj. glasove u kolektivnom odlučivanju. JNA s vodećim zagovornicima unitarističke koncepcije i Miloševićeva politika srpskog nacionalizma, uviđajući neizbježni raspad Jugoslavije i odcjepljenje zapadnih republika, sve više su se približavale u sredstvima i ciljevima.

Treba naglasiti da iako etnička ravnoteža u vojsci vjerojatno ne bi mogla spriječiti rat i agresiju, zasigurno bi još više “otupila” napad JNA, jer bi više protivnika unitarističke koncepcije u JNA odgodilo donošenje i provođenje odluka njezina vrha. Također, može se vidjeti kako je etnička reprezentativnost u omjeru vojnika smanjila moć djelovanja JNA.

¹¹ To je potvrdio i sam Kadijević: “JNA je predstavljala osnovu na kojoj su formirane tri srpske vojske - Vojska SRJ, Vojska RS i Vojska RSK… obaveza JNA bila da celokupnom srpskom narodu obezbedi njegovu vojsku, bez koje on na ovim prostorima i u uslovima koje su neprijatelji nametnuli nema, ne samo slobode, već ni života” (Kadijević 1993.).

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Yugoslavia
The Military and Society

For most of the 1980s, the YPA was considered the strongest unifying institution in the country. The military played a fundamental role in preventing the dissolution of the federal state after the death of Tito and the dramatic rise of ethnic tensions in the 1980s. By 1990, however, serious problems had developed in YPA ranks and in its relationship to society as a whole.

The YPA remained very popular in Serbia in the 1980s. A former federal secretary for national defense served as president of Serbia in 1984, and a retired chief of the YPA general staff held that position in 1988. The predominantly Serbian leadership of the YPA made high profile appeals for national unity and public order. To non-Serbs, however, these calls seemed to be demands for greater centralism to the detriment of the federal system.

The YPA faced growing criticism and antimilitary attitudes from civilians of other nationalities. Although the organization remained unified, divisive tensions paralleled Yugoslavia's growing social problems. Nationalist movements in several regions of the country posed the most immediate threat: to many observers, ethnic strife complicated the YPA missions of defending against external threats and suppressing internal ones. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the civilian press, especially in Slovenia, subjected the military to unprecedented criticism and scrutiny. It called the YPA an undemocratic institution that favored Serbs over other nationalities. Investigative reports described the use of military labor to build expensive villas for the LCY and YPA leadership. The press questioned the use of military force in situations of internal unrest. Slovene reporters revealed Yugoslavia's role as an intermediary in Swedish arms sales to Libya (see Arms Sales , this ch.). The controversial story led to a military investigation of the reporters and an effort to silence public criticism of the YPA (see Courts, Detention, and Punishment , this ch.). In 1988 former secretary for national defense asserted that hostile elements were tarnishing the military's reputation and stirring ethnic unrest among military personnel. Alleged uprisings plotted by ethnic Albanians in the YPA were mentioned prominently in his speech. He claimed that attacks on the YPA destabilized the country's constitutional order by undermining one of its most important institutions.

In the 1980s, physical attacks on YPA personnel increased. In 1985 alone, thirty attacks were reported. Nineteen soldiers were attacked during mass demonstrations protesting the arrests of the journalists who had publicized the arms deal with Libya. While asserting that most attacks were motivated by nationalists and separatists, the military did not reveal that the majority of incidents involved recent, non-Serbian YPA conscripts. For example, in 1987 an ethnic Albanian conscript murdered four soldiers in a federal army garrison in Serbia in what may have been an ethnically motivated incident.

As in all Yugoslav institutions, the delicacy of the ethnic balance in the YPA had a serious impact on the military's effectiveness. Article 242 of the Constitution requires that the senior YPA command and officer corps reflect proportional representation of all nations and nationalities. However, the proportion of Serbs in the YPA was higher than that in the total population. In 1983 Serbs made up more than 57 percent of the YPA officer corps. And an even higher percentage of Serbs reportedly occupied the high command positions. Virtually every former federal secretary for national defense or chief of the YPA General Staff was a Serb. Among the other nationalities, Montenegrins had a strong military tradition and close ties to Serbia. They made up over 10 percent of the officer corps but only 3 percent of the total population. Croats and Slovenes were the most seriously underrepresented nationalities in the YPA officer corps. They made up only 15 and 5 percent, respectively, of all officers, and 20 and 8 percent respectively of the civilian population. Croats confronted some discrimination in the YPA because of lingering doubts about their loyalty to the Yugoslav state. Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, and Hungarians constituted a small fraction of the officer corps. Serbian officers and noncommissioned officers commanded YPA forces that included mostly non-Serbian soldiers. Serbian officers tended to have a strong all-Yugoslav outlook while the non-Serbian conscripts they commanded brought with them a strong bias toward their own region. Nationalism was particularly intense among the increasing number of ethnic Albanian conscripts from Kosovo.

Every YPA unit included soldiers of each nationality. With the exception of the Serbs, conscripts usually were not trained or stationed in their home republics or provinces. This practice ensured troop loyalty during internal security actions by the army. For example, Macedonian soldiers would likely have fewer reservations about using force to restore order among the population of Kosovo than against their fellow Macedonians.

Because the YPA was assigned the role of maintaining the federal Yugoslav state, nationalist friction among members of the armed forces was an especially important problem. By 1990, this situation raised serious questions as to whether the YPA could contain ethnic tension in its own ranks, much less the entire country. As in other facets of Yugoslav life, Tito's leadership had inspired cooperation toward unified military achievement; following his death, fundamental ethnic hostilities began to surface. Doubts also arose about the dependability of troops from certain nationalities in defending Yugoslavia against external attack. In 1990 such doubts fell especially on the Croats, ethnic Albanians, and Slovenes because of political and economic conditions that had emerged in their regions in the 1980s (see Regional Political Issues , ch. 4).

A series of Croatian demands for military autonomy brought forceful suppression of the Croatian separatist movement by Serbdominated YPA forces in 1971 and 1972. The Croats sought permission to perform compulsory YPA service in their home republic, instead of automatically being assigned elsewhere, and some even demanded formation of a separate army in their republic. The latter demand, with its implications for Croatian independence, prompted YPA intervention to keep the republic in the federal state. This crisis demonstrated the extent of the ethnic fault line in the YPA. In the decades following the massive Croatian collaboration with the Nazis in World War II, Croatian officers and soldiers had largely restored the group's reputation for military reliability. But the separatist crisis of 1971-72 resuscitated doubts about Croatian loyalty. In the aftermath of the crisis, many Croatian officers who either actively or tacitly supported Croat nationalists were purged from the YPA; this purge heightened Croatian hostility toward the national military establishment.

In 1981 similar tensions existed in Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians there complained that YPA forces used excessive brutality in suppressing the massive nationalist uprisings that year. Periodic disturbances lasted throughout the 1980s (see Kosovo , ch. 4). Setting an ominous precedent for the future, the residents of Kosovo actively resisted YPA intervention and the semipermanent occupation of their province by YPA detachments. In 1987 the YPA held large-scale maneuvers in Slovenia. Because the Slovenes had also made serious demands for political and economic autonomy in the 1980s, those maneuvers seemed a possible prelude to YPA intervention in that republic. Some observers feared that, under the weight of nationalism, the YPA might eventually degenerate into rival armed ethnic militias fighting a civil war.

Data as of December 1990

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+yu0185)

Napomena: YPA = JNA


citat:

The Military and the Party

In 1990 more than 100,000 YPA soldiers, airmen, and sailors were members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and formed party cells in the military. Because party membership was a criterion for officer status, virtually all officers were LCY members. Despite this, LCY control over the YPA was relatively loose. In fact, the large number of military personnel in the LCY made the YPA a powerful constituency with interests claiming full party attention.

As in most communist states, military representation in the party leadership was significant in the 1980s. The LCY Committee in the YPA was virtually a military wing of the party. The president of the committee, always a general, was likely eventually to become federal secretary for national defense.

Tito controlled the YPA by exercising his tremendous personal authority and purging the ranks occasionally, while allowing considerable professional autonomy. Many YPA leaders were loyal Tito compatriots from the Partisan years, although their numbers were declining noticeably by the late 1980s.

Military influence in the political system increased steadily after the early 1970s. The military earned its influence by stabilizing Yugoslavia during critical periods of internal tension. In 1979 its high political profile obligated the YPA to issue a formal disavowal of any intention to assume power after Tito's death. In the 1980s, the constant speculation about the political role of the YPA was due less to the political ambitions of Yugoslav generals than to the many social, economic, and political crises afflicting the state. On several occasions, military leaders felt compelled to warn that the army would not allow disunity to cause the dissolution of the Yugoslav state.

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+yu0179

citat:

The predominantly Serbian leadership of the YPA made high profile appeals for national unity and public order. To non-Serbs, however, these calls seemed to be demands for greater centralism to the detriment of the federal system.

The YPA faced growing criticism and antimilitary attitudes from civilians of other nationalities. Although the organization remained unified, divisive tensions paralleled Yugoslavia's growing social problems. Nationalist movements in several regions of the country posed the most immediate threat: to many observers, ethnic strife complicated the YPA missions of defending against external threats and suppressing internal ones. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the civilian press, especially in Slovenia, subjected the military to unprecedented criticism and scrutiny. It called the YPA an undemocratic institution that favored Serbs over other nationalities.

As in all Yugoslav institutions, the delicacy of the ethnic balance in the YPA had a serious impact on the military's effectiveness. Article 242 of the Constitution requires that the senior YPA command and officer corps reflect proportional representation of all nations and nationalities. However, the proportion of Serbs in the YPA was higher than that in the total population. In 1983 Serbs made up more than 57 percent of the YPA officer corps. And an even higher percentage of Serbs reportedly occupied the high command positions. Virtually every former federal secretary for national defense or chief of the YPA General Staff was a Serb. Among the other nationalities, Montenegrins had a strong military tradition and close ties to Serbia. They made up over 10 percent of the officer corps but only 3 percent of the total population. Croats and Slovenes were the most seriously underrepresented nationalities in the YPA officer corps. They made up only 15 and 5 percent, respectively, of all officers, and 20 and 8 percent respectively of the civilian population. Croats confronted some discrimination in the YPA because of lingering doubts about their loyalty to the Yugoslav state. Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, and Hungarians constituted a small fraction of the officer corps. Serbian officers and noncommissioned officers commanded YPA forces that included mostly non-Serbian soldiers. Serbian officers tended to have a strong all-Yugoslav outlook while the non-Serbian conscripts they commanded brought with them a strong bias toward their own region. Nationalism was particularly intense among the increasing number of ethnic Albanian conscripts from Kosovo.

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+yu0185

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Assessment.
The irony of Tito’s remarkable life is that he created the conditions for the eventual destruction of his lifelong effort. Instead of allowing the process of democratization to establish its own limits, he constantly upset the work of reformers while failing to satisfy their adversaries. He created a federal state, yet he constantly fretted over the pitfalls of decentralization. He knew that the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and others could not be integrated within some new supranation, nor would they willingly accept the hegemony of any of their number; yet his supranational Yugoslavism frequently smacked of unitarism. He promoted self-management but never gave up on the party’s monopoly of power. He permitted broad freedoms in science, art, and culture that were unheard of in the Soviet bloc, but he kept excoriating the West. He preached peaceful coexistence but built an army that, in 1991, delivered the coup de grâce to the dying Yugoslav state. At his death, the state treasury was empty and political opportunists unchecked. He died too late for constructive change, too early to prevent chaos.

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/597295/Josip-Broz-Tito

citat:

On March 1, 1945, the PLA was reconstituted as the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA). During the Cold War, nonaligned Yugoslavia adopted a strategy of “Total National Defense” against possible invasion by the Soviet bloc or the Western allies, in which the YPA was supplemented by locally based, Partisan-style Territorial Defense Forces. Upon the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991–92, these militias became the nuclei of armed forces that defended seceding republics from the YPA, which, like the royal Yugoslav army before it, had become dominated by Serbs.

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/445176/Partisan#ref=ref141667

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History » Modern Serbia » Disintegration of the federation
Milošević’s reluctance to institute a multiparty political system delayed any movement in that direction not only in Serbia but more importantly in the federation. During 1989 and 1990, therefore, when the federation was in greatest need of relegitimizing itself, and when other republican governments were successfully reestablishing their roles through popular election, the federal government was left with no means of forming a mandate for its own program of change. In return, other republican leaders refused to sanction continuing Serbian repression in Kosovo. Deepening divisions along these lines led to the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990, and over the next 12 months the federation slid into war.
Serbian policy during the war of Yugoslav succession hovered uneasily between a need to protect the specific interests of the Serbian republic and a desire to defend the wider Serb diaspora, the choice of which was usually shaped by the tactics the SPS used to defend its position. When the Slovene and Croatian governments implemented their threat to withdraw from the federation on June 25, 1991, a 10-day war was fought between the multiethnic Yugoslav People’s Army (the JNA) and Slovene militia and civilian reserves. The clash ended with the ignominious withdrawal of the Yugoslav army into Croatia, where the JNA troops then squared off with Croatian paramilitary groups. Germany’s quick recognition of the new independent states of Slovenia and Croatia killed any hope that the breakup of Yugoslavia could be stalled or prevented. Serbian nationalists viewed this act as an unnecessary interference in a regional conflict that only exacerbated an already tense situation.
From the Serbs’ perspective, the loss of Slovenia could be countenanced as very few Serbs lived there; for the same reason, the independence of Macedonia in September 1991 went uncontested. Croatia and Bosnia, however, were a different matter: there Serbs constituted 12 percent and 31 percent of the population, respectively. Serbia backed local Serbs in civil wars with the aim of retaining some areas of the republics within the rump of Yugoslavia.
Parts of Croatia along its border with Bosnia and adjoining the Vojvodina were formed into the Republic of the Serbian Krajina. The Croatian city of Vukovar surrendered to Serb forces in November 1991. In January 1992 a UN-sponsored cease-fire was negotiated between the Croatian National Guard and the Serb forces, which permitted patrols by a UN Protection Force.
Initially, with the assistance of the Yugoslav People’s Army, local Serb militias carved out several autonomous regions in Bosnia, which were consolidated in March 1992 into the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A bitter and protracted war broke out between the forces that were loyal to the government of Bosnia, Croatian units attempting to secure a union among Croatia and Croat-majority areas of the republic, and a secessionist Serb army. The destructive use of “ethnic cleansing” (depopulating areas of a particular ethnic group) by irregular Serb troops to gain a stronghold in places with a mixed population created a flood of refugees. Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, was besieged by Serb forces from May 1992 to December 1995, during which its citizens endured severe privations and losses.
John B. Allcock

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/654691/Serbia/214087/Disintegration-of-the-federation#ref=ref477353

Par istorijskih činjenica:

Uviđajući da se četnici uopće ne bore protiv Nijemaca, nego s njima surađuju, Saveznici vrše snažan pritisak na kralja Petra i izbjegličku vladu u Londonu da se odreknu Mihailovića i sklope sporazum sa Titom. Kralj popušta i 1. juna 1944. imenuje za predsjednika vlade Hrvata Ivana Šubašića, sa zadatkom da sklopi sporazum s NKOJ. Milošević gubi položaj ministra. Sredinom juna Šubašić na Visu sklapa prvi sporazum s Titom.

1943. u užoj Srbiji je bilo samo oko 22.000 partizana, a godinu dana kasnije oko 204.000 ili ukupno u cijeloj Srbiji 264.000.
Tito im je, tražeći njihovu pomoć, nudio amnestiju 17. augusta 1944.. Samo mjesec dana kasnije kralj Petar II. iz Londona poziva svoje četnike da se pridruže partizanima.

Pod daljim pritiscima, kralj Petar 29. augusta 1944. ukida četničku Vrhovnu komandu u zemlji; Mihailović je nekoliko dana kasnije penzionisan. Kralj je 12. septembra preko BBC-a uputio poziv svim Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencima "da se ujedine i stupe u Narodnooslobodilačku vojsku pod vodstvom maršala Tita«. Ko se ne odazove tom pozivu, »neće izbjeći pečat izdaje pred narodom i istorijom". (Šepić, str. 280)

Kad su pod ruskim vodstvom partizani ušli u Beograd, nastao je pravi stampedo prelaska iz četnika u partizane.

I partizani i četnici bili su za Jugoslaviju: prvi za komunističku, drugi za kraljevinu.

Pred kraj rata stvorili su koaliciju, velikosrbi su prihvatili komunizam kao sredstvo za stvaranje velike Srbije. Kad se komunizam napokon raspao, velika se Srbija razotkrila u svoj svojoj biti, koristeći pojam Jugoslavija za zbunjivanje domaće i svjetske javnosti.